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INTRODUCTION
The United States has a sordid history of denying Blacks fair criminal trials. The Civil Rights Movement brought this history to light and
spurred the evolution of jurisprudence aimed at preventing overt racism
from infecting the criminal trial process. However, the effectiveness of the
doctrine is an open question at present. While courts have explicitly forbidden the use of argumentation that injects "the issue of race" into the
trial, and have admonished prosecutors not to make use of racist arguments, it is unclear whether these holdings bar indirect, yet highly
inflammatory, racist prosecutorial summations.
This Article addresses the question of the appropriate response of
appellate counsel for Black defendants tarred at trial by the indirect deployment of powerful racial stereotypes. The crux of the problem is that
even now, the courts only take exception to blatant racist appeals, even
though indirectly racist summations can have a determinative impact at
trial. In laying out the contours of the problem, we must draw upon the
discipline of rhetoric, or persuasion through oration, to describe various
techniques of intentional indirectness that prosecutors use to obviate the
possibility of appellate review under the stringent standards of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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In doing so, it is possible to demonstrate how the congruency between the techniques being used to deploy racist stereotypes in
prosecutors' closing argument and the classical techniques of indirect assertion might be used to provide evidence of intentional misconduct, and
thus to provide access to this more searching standard of appellate review
of these summations. This Article will hopefully serve as an indication of
how an interdisciplinary approach to the problem will not be useful only
in illuminating its contours, but also to any challenge to the injustices that
result from this type of prosecutorial misconduct. To this end, the second
half of the Article also outlines an interdisciplinary approach to writing
appellate briefs that attempts to highlight and address these implicitly racist prosecutorial summations.
Part one of this Article is an outline of the history of judicial approaches to racist summations. This section is dedicated to supporting the
proposition that racist argumentation in prosecutors' summations was
widely acceptable to the appellate courts until two decades ago. Until that
time, prosecutors could describe defendants with racially tinged analogies
or even with recognizable racial epithets, if the evidence "supported" the
characterization. This changed in 1987, when the death penalty decision
McCleskey v. Kemp included reasoning that suggested that racist descriptions of a defendant were good grounds for an equal protection challenge
to the conviction.' Several of the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal then
elaborated upon this position, making it clear that a defendant subjected
to racist oratory by the prosecutor is entitled to a standard of review that
places the burden of proof on the prosecutor to demonstrate a good faith
reason to advance the allegedly racist arguments. However, as this Article
details, the decisions of the courts that explicitly forbade racist prosecutorial discourse did not destroy the incentive to engage in this practice
rather, they merely created an incentive for prosecutors to avoid being
caught.
Part two explains the continuing and powerful incentive to "define"
Black defendants by reference to widely circulated and deeply rooted racist caricatures. After McCleskey, prosecutors can continue to try to call
these racist stereotypes to the minds of the jurors surreptitiously during
their closing arguments. Both classical rhetorical theory and modern persuasion theory indicate how useful appeals to stereotypes can be, and
provide some evidence that prosecutors concerned with winning close
cases might be prepared to appeal to any latent racism in the minds of the
jurors. As such, it is unclear whether the doctrine in McCleskey that allows
for equal protection challenges to racist summations has provided, or will
provide, a significant disincentive to implicitly racist rhetorical practices.
The key question is whether or not judges can learn how to recognize

1.

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481

U.S. 279,309, n.30 (1987).
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the techniques that prosecutors have used to covertly advance racist argumentation.
Part three demonstrates that the appellate courts are not adept at
scrutinizing summations for implicitly racist arguments, as they failed miserably to notice the most thinly veiled attempt to tar Wanda Jean Allen, a
Black woman convicted of murder and later executed.2 Allen's case demonstrates the impact of the court's failure to recognize and address racist
arguments that rely on classical rhetorical figures of definition, which are
extremely effective in catalyzing a racist response in jurors.
In part four, I explain why it is so easy for prosecutors to evoke
strong racist responses towards African Americans without explicitly deploying any clearly objectionable language that would invite reversal.
Here, I focus not on the rhetorical techniques that would serve to achieve
this end, but on the raw material for these operations-the enduring fear
and mistrust of African Americans, which has crystallized into a stereotype
known as the "brute caricature." 3 Empirical psychological studies of the
predictive power of this caricature illustrate why it is a powerful resource
for prosecutors charged with making a case against Black defendants
charged with violent crimes. The incentive for the deployment of figures
of definition that associate a Black defendant with the stereotype is thus
made clear.
Part five outlines four rhetorical techniques (classically denominated
the "figures of definition") that prosecutors often use to provoke a racist
response from juries, methods that usually do not lead to reversal. The
four figures are systrophe, antonomasia, cirumitio, and paralipsis. Despite the
fact that these figures are drawn from texts dating back to antiquity, they
are still routinely used, as the cases discussed and cited illustrate. The case
studies indicate that prosecutors are adept at deploying these figures (even
if the prosecutors have no theoretical knowledge of the means they use to
accomplish their rhetorical goals) and can even combine them when attempting to brand a Black defendant as a deviant outsider, i.e., one not
deserving of mercy or the presumption of innocence.
Finally, part six outlines a method that appellate attorneys raising
claims of prosecutorial misconduct on direct review might use to uncover
and explain how implicitly racist argumentation has worked to prejudice
their clients at trial. This section contains the argument that scholars of
rhetoric and persuasion theory should lend their insights to appellate attorneys in order to reconstruct the intention of the prosecution when
they make use of figures of definition that mask the deployment of racist
stereotypes. The Article concludes with a discussion of how an appellate
attorney's scrutiny of these summations through the lens of rhetorical

3.

See discussion infra pp. 26-35.
See GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE

4.

See infra pp. 43-65.

2.

BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND

(1971).
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theory might be the first step towards obtaining holdings that would narrow the range of rhetorical devices that can be used to racist ends, so that
an even more searching review of prosecutorial argumentative misconduct could be brought about in the near future.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF RACIST RHETORIC
IN THE SUMMATIONS OF CRIMINAL TRIALS

While prosecutors may attempt to inject racism into a criminal trial
at any point during the proceedings, the closing argument remains the
most opportune moment to do so.The summation is the last word spoken
by the prosecutor to the jury and is relatively unencumbered by formal
restraints. The closing argument has been described as "the high point in
the art of advocacy; it is the combination and culmination of all its many
elements. It is the climax of the case."' "It is the most important phase or
segment of any jury trial."'6
A. The Impact of a ProsecutorialSummation Alluding to Racist Stereotypes
on a Defendant of a Minority Race and the History of
the Courts' Failure to Acknowledge that Harm
In criminal trials, the summation is the moment where the persuasive powers of the prosecution are strained to their fullest, and also the
moment at which the impact of any "foul blows",7 inflicted by the prosecutor upon the defendant have the greatest effect. Racism at this point in
the trial is particularly prejudicial, since the prosecution's use of unfair and
inflammatory arguments "hurts the defendant just as much [as if the]
prejudicial blasts come from the trumpet of the Angel Gabriel' 8 In response, courts have diverged from the common law approach (which
depended upon the corrective mechanisms inherent to the adversarial
system) 9 and developed a doctrine that allows appellate judges to address
5.

LLOYD. P. STRYKER, THE ART OF ADVOCACY, 11 (1975).

6.
George. T. Davis, Preface to PETER.C. LAGARIAS, EFFECTIVE CLOSING ARGUMENT,
xix (1989).
7.
Berger v. United States, 295 US. 78, 88 (1935) stating that:
[t]he United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy .... He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one.
8.
United States v. Nettl, 121 F2d 927,930 (3d Cir. 1941).
9.
See Marian Neef & Stuart Nagel, The Adversary Nature of the American Legal System from a HistoricalPerspective,20 N.YL.F 123, (1974).
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both the inflammatory argumentation advanced by prosecutors in general
and racist summations in particular.
The new doctrine developed on the basis of reasoning in McCleskey
v. Kempl ° (described extensively infra), involves an application of the Equal
Protection Clause (of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) to the closing arguments of criminal trials, since the use of a
defendant's Blackness as evidence of his guilt is clearly unequal treatment.
The new restrictions on summations are an appropriate limitation on the
arguments of prosecutors since they are "the representative[s] not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win
a case, but that justice shall be done."' However, while it has long been
noted that the prosecution's rhetorical blows should be carefully policed,
their power to elicit racist responses has until recently gone unrecognized,
at least by the courts.
The recognition of the power of the summation to inflame racist attitudes in the jury is a relatively recent development. Historically, courts
have used a legal fiction to forestall an adequate assessment of the dangers
inherent in racist prosecutorial argumentation: that closing arguments
merely restate the evidence in a logical and sequential manner. This fiction ignores the fact that closing argument is customarily used to
persuade the jury and to move them-emotionally-to take action. As a
result, even when the courts did take note of the power of the summation
in a criminal trial, they cast this power in logical terms:
[C]losing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for
resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case. For it is only
after all the evidence is in that counsel for the parties are in a
position to present their respective versions of the case as a
whole. Only then can they argue the inferences to be drawn
from all the testimony and to point out the weaknesses of their
adversary's positions ....In a criminal trial, which is in the end
basically a factfinding process, no aspect of such advocacy
could be more important than the opportunity finally to marshal the evidence for each side before the submission of the case
to judgment. 2
However, while the courts embraced this fiction, lawyers disdained
this logical approach to summation. The leading texts on summation
counsel lawyers that "the closing argument is an exercise in persuasion"
and explicitly instruct them not to "consider the closing argument simply
10.
11.
12.

481 U.S. 279
Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
Herring v. NewYork, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (emphasis added).
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as an opportunity to review the evidence and to relate the ' evidence to
3
the law. Such a view stultifies the noble art of argumentation.
Courts failed to recognize the emotional power of racist argumentation in trials, despite the wide chasm between their idealized view of
summation and the reality of summations as delivered by members of the
practicing bar. Consequently, appellate courts traditionally rejected appellants' complaints of racist argumentation. Until recently, federal courts
embraced an analysis that focused on whether the use of a comparison
between a negative racial caricature and the defendant was a reasonable
argument, based on facts in the record.14 The courts ignored the prejudicial impact of the emotional inflammation caused by the racist
comparison on the defendant, since the courts ignored all the extralogical dimensions of prosecutorial argumentation.
While it is difficult to locate an early example of racist courtroom
discourse directed against Black defendants, probably owing to the prohibitive costs of appeals before appellate counsel was provided free of
charge, it is possible to find analogous examples involving Jewish defendants dating from this era. The case of Michael Heitler is of the most well
known examples of the courts' insistence that racist argumentation should
only be considered prejudicial if it is false. Despite the fact that the prosecution's characterization of Heitler repeatedly made use of anti-Semitic
epithets,"s the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction:
"Counsel is also charged with having said, when speaking of a
Jewish defendant named Michael Heitler: 'How much like
Shylock he looked. He demanded his pound of flesh and he
bled his victims' .... It was not for the court to determine the
wisdom of the reference, or the appropriateness of the characterization. The court was merely to determine whether there
was any evidence to justify the argument." 6
In essence, before the advent of a more expansive reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the courts considered a defendant's purported
correspondence with the stereotype as enough to justify a comparison
between the defendant and a racial caricature like Shylock, the Christianhating and vicious Jewish moneylender of Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice. 7 This analysis gave prosecutors license to describe defendants as

JAMES WJEANs,TRIAL ADVOCACY 368-71 (1975). Jeans' text was published within
13.
that era's leading series of practice guides,West's "Handbook Series."
See United States ex. rel Heitler, 274 F 401,410 (N. D. I1, 1921).
14.
LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE (Columbia University Press 1968)
15.
(1966).
Heider, 274 E at 410.
16.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE ("I hate him for he is a Chris17.
tian; But more for that in low simplicity. He lends our money gratis, and brings down the

332
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"Shylocks" or as "Black Brutes" (a caricature I will describe extensively
infra). However, the courts' tolerance for overtly racist argumentation declined when overt racism came under attack within society as a whole
from progressive social movements.
B. The Courts' Recognition of the Harm Caused by Racist Summations Did not
Destroy the Incentive to Inject Racist Argument into CriminalTrials
In the two decades following the Civil Rights Movement, federal
courts began to rule that describing the defendant in derogatory racial
terms was a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses (of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.) Drawing upon the holdings in cases decided by the various Circuit Courts of
Appeal, the Supreme Court stated in 1987: "[t]he Constitution prohibits
racially biased prosecutorial arguments.""8 Several Circuit Courts of Appeal subsequently held that both the prosecutor's use of racial epithets
(e.g. "colored") and calling the jurors' attention to the defendant's race
(e.g., describing a defendant's hair in order to call attention to her race)
can constitute reversible error, even when not objected to at trial by the
19
defendant's counsel.
At present, a prosecutor who makes note of the defendant's race
during summation, who describes the characteristics that mark the defendant as a member of that race, or who uses racial epithets, increasingly
subjects herself to the risk of reversal upon appeal. The principles of
rhetoric and effective persuasion, however, continue to push prosecutors
to define the Black defendant in negative terms that pander to the preconceptions of her audience, since racial stereotypes which stimulate fear
of the defendant are a strong inducement to find the defendant guilty.
rate of usance here with us in Venice.") See also Judith S. Koffler, Terror and Mutilation in the
Golden Age, 5 HuM. RTs. Q. 116 (1983).
18.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,309, n.30 (1987).
19.
Bains v. Cambra, 204 F3d 964 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that testimony about
Sikh religious practices "that invited the jury to give in to their prejudices and to buy into
the various stereotypes that the prosecutor was promoting" was constitutional error, although harmless); United States v. Cannon, 88 E3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding the
prosecutor committed reversible error in a racially charged case "by twice calling the African American defendants 'bad people' and by calling attention to the fact that the
defendants were not locals, the prosecutor gave the jury an improper and convenient hook
on which to hang their verdict"); United States v. Doe, 903 E2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(holding that "what is happening in Washington, D.C. is that Jamaicans are coming in,
they're taking over the retail sale of crack in Washington, D.C."); United States ex. rel
Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F2d 152 (2d. Cir. 1973) (holding that "prosecutor's remarks
introduced race prejudice into the trial and thereby denied petitioner his constitutional
right under the due process clause to a fair trial."); see also ROBERT M. GOLDMAN r AL., 6
CRIMINAL LAw ADVOCACY § 4A.03(2)(i) (2005) (gathering cases after Bains discussing this
point of law.)

SPRING

2006]

Appellate Review

Techniques that identify the defendant as a threat to the community are
especially useful to prosecutors, since they serve to motivate jurors to
punish the defendant (and to protect the community) by returning a
2
guilty verdict.
If racism against Blacks is still pervasive within American society
(and this Article posits that this is the case), 21 there will be a strong incentive for prosecutors to cater to prejudices about African American
defendants. It should be noted that trial advocacy texts routinely direct
lawyers to "argue in terms of the already acceptable [and] consider the
characteristics of the individual jurors";2 1 thus, where the jurors possess
latent racial biases, trial advocacy implicitly teaches prosecutors to pander
to that bias. While the jury pool in many communities may no longer be
exclusively White, this is not true of others, and legal doctrine reflects the
fact that prosecutors often attempt to obtain all-White juries when prosecuting Black defendants.2 3 While one might object that racist jurors may
be removed by voir dire questions designed to expose juror's racism, there
is no reason to believe that virulent racists will be forthright and will
withhold opinions that they know most members of society believe
should not be expressed.
If it is likely that White jurors possess negative stereotypes about
Black defendants, this creates a clear incentive for prosecutors to cater to
jurors' prejudices with racist argumentation, either overt or subtle. Given
these incentives, it is the courts' willingness to address covert racism that is
crucial to the creation of an effective deterrent.

20.
See, e.g., United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1085 (1985).
[P]rosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order to
protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking.
The evil lurking in such prosecutorial appeals is that the defendant will be
convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or innocence. Jurors
may be persuaded by such appeals to believe that, by convicting a defendant,
they will assist in the solution of some pressing social problem. The amelioration of society's woes is far too heavy a burden for the individual criminal
defendant to bear.
21.

On the basis of studies cited infra at n.67-68.

22.

AL J. CONE & VERNE LAWYER, THE ART OF PERSUASION

IN LITIGATION 333,

(1985).
23.
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). A potential juror who may admit:
"want[ing] to find the [B]lack defendant guilty simply because 'We gotta teach these niggers how to act' ... would destroy his credibility as an impartial factfinder[.]."JEi'~s, supra
note 13, at 370. Furthermore, for every one venireperson who would otherwise openly
use racial epithets, there are likely many more who harbor unconscious racism, of the type
that is nearly impossible to expose in voir dire (and which therefore necessitates a far more
sensitive understanding by the appellate courts of how racist arguments can be promoted
unnoticed.)
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INCENTIVE STRUCTURE CREATED BY THE APPELLATE COURTS
ENCOURAGES IMPLICITLY R.ACIST RHETORIC

A prosecutor tempted to make an implicit appeal to racism must
consider the balance of risks and rewards. The rewards are particularly
high when the case is very close, since it is then that the closing argument
becomes determinative. "Closing arguments are best compared to the last
minute of a basketball game: If one team leads by 20 points, the last minute will be meaningless; but if the game is very close, that last minute will
be all that matters. Similarly ... for a certain number of cases, the verdict
hangs on the summation speeches. 24 There are several related reasons why
inserting implicitly racist argumentation into a summation might be attractive to prosecutors that relate to the rhetorical goals that it may help
them to achieve,2 5especially when they believe that a conviction is hanging in the balance. To understand the way these motivations might shape
prosecutors' closing arguments, we must discuss the tenets of rhetorical
theory.
A. Rhetorical Theory Indicates that There is Much to Be Gained by Implicitly
Defining the Defendant as a Member of the Racialized "Other"
All modern texts discussing orations before the jury are beholden to
262
Cicero 6 and Aristotle. 7 Countless manuals written about closing arguments highlight the two extra-logical aspects of public speaking, ethos and
pathos, which the founders of the Western rhetorical tradition and those
who followed in their footsteps elaborated upon in great detail. First is the
importance of forming a personal connection between yourself and the
jury based on shared beliefs and attitudes, thus creating a positive ethos
that will predispose the jurors to be persuaded by your arguments. Second
is appealing to the emotions of the jurors, so that they are not only inclined to believe that your arguments are correct, but to be moved to
action through an emotional reaction. "Ethos, as well as emotional appeals,
may also result in a favorable bonding or rapport between counsel and
,,28
jury.

24.
RICHARD.J. CRwFoRD, THE PERSUASION EDGE 161 (1984).
25.
See the discussion of ethos, in section IliA, infa.
26.
RIcIAD. D. RIEKE & RANDALL. K. STUTMAN, COMMUNICATION IN LEGAL ADvocAcy, at ix (1990): "In the more than two thousand years since Cicero wrote, the
relationship between research in rhetorical/communication theory and the practice of
trial advocacy has waxed and waned, but it is probably as vital as it has ever been."
27.
LAGARIAS, supra note 6, at 108: "the process of finding the best available means to
persuade a jury or judge to reach a particular verdict may usefully begin by referring to
Aristotle's categories: ethos, pathos, logos, and style."
28.
Id. at 110.
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One of the best means for a prosecutor to establish her ethos and to
appeal to the jurors' pathos in the context of the criminal trial is to define
the defendant as a member of the "other., 29 In that way, the speaker can
draw a line around the defendant, locating both herself and her audience
on the same opposite of that line-thereby defining the attorney as a
trustworthy member of the jurors' community. Defining the defendant as
someone outside of the moral community can also induce a negative
emotional response towards the defendant. Prosecutors have used this
technique from the time of Cicero ° until the present.' Classical rhetoricians described the methods of defining the terms critical to the oration
(in this case, the essential nature of the defendant) in great detail.
Cicero defined "definition" as a rhetorical device whereby the
speaker invites his audience to envision the relationship between one
thing and the category to which it belongs, so that the audience will consider the similarities between the defined object and other members of
the class to which it belongs.32 A speaker can best accomplish this task
with the rhetorical "figures" of definition, which allow the speaker to
posit that the person or thing being "defined" can be best understood by
reference to its classification within a group.33 (Classical rhetoricians called
these techniques of definition "figures" because at that time, the "figures
of speech" included not only ways of expression but strategies of argument.) As will be discussed extensively below, some of these figures are
explicit, involving a logical argument about why the defined object
should be considered as a member of the class (horismus), while others rely
upon the connections and ideas already in the minds of the listeners, and
reinforce these already existing connections merely by allusion (antonomasia, systrophe, circumitio, and paralipsis).

29.
See generally Craig Haney, Condemning The Other In Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism, Structural Mitigation, And The Empathic Divide, 53 DEPAut L. R.v. 1557, 1583
(2004) stating that:
[r]acism involves the opportunistic use of race to disempower the group
constructed as 'other' in order [t]o empower our group by contrast to 'them.
This requires the creation and maintenance of an essentialist, 'natural kinds'
category scheme that imbues the 'others' with intrinsic, immutable qualities
making them different from us. If the psychological distance between white
jurors and African American defendants is even greater than usual-for example, if the jurors themselves are especially racially prejudiced--then the
problem is much worse.
30.
See, e.g., Cicero's branding ofVerres as a plutocrat in THE VERRINE ORATIONS I &
II, (L.H.G. Greenwood trans., 1970).
31.
Even the trial advocacy texts that refer to the most modern approaches to persuasion and are ostensibly anti-classical in approach make reference to the Aristotelian
categories. See CRAwFoR, supra note 24, at 179.
32.
CICERO, TopicA § 3.13-14 (Tobias Reinhart trans., 2004).
33.
These techniques will be discussed extensively infra.
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According to both the canons of classical rhetoric and modern
theories of public speaking, techniques of persuasion cannot be effective
unless the speaker first understands her audience members' nature-and
in particular, their well-fixed beliefs. Aristotle, a founder of the Western
rhetorical tradition, explicitly recommended that the speaker take note of
the prejudices likely to be held by the jurors, and to adapt her approach to
conform to these preconceptions.34 While early theorists did not understand ideological beliefs and prejudices in the sophisticated terms that
cognitive science employs today, their philosophy of mind led them to
draw surprisingly similar conclusions about how preconceptions would
shape perception. 5
In any modern multicultural society, particularly in those founded
upon the subordination of one or more racial groups, a prosecutor's desire
to adapt his rhetoric to the demands of his audience, especially when that
audience is comprised only of members of the dominant race, can lead to
oratory containing racist allusions, both open and hidden. The temptation
to invoke a commonality with the jurors on the basis of racist beliefs, and
to motivate the jury to deliver a verdict by appealing to these same beliefs
can be significant. In fact, social science has revealed these beliefs to be
both widely held and quite likely to provoke a rhetorically desirable response, if evoked.36 However, the likelihood that prosecutors will invoke
them is determined not only by the probability that these arguments
would be well received by juries, but more significantly, whether they will
provoke censure by judges.
B. Appellate Courts Cannot Provide a Disincentive to Prosecutors' Use
of Implicitly Racist Summations Unless they Learn to Recognize the
Rhetorical Techniques that Call to Mind Racist Caricatures
The risks associated with advancing objectionable argumentation
include the possibility of sanctions, either at the trial or on appeal. However, the possibility of sanctions is so remote as to be of negligible
importance.37 A trial judge can admonish the prosecutor during his closing argument, but the probability that the trial judge will chastise the
34.
See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE RI-ETrolc, § 1390a (George. A. Kennedy trans., 1991)
("People always think well of speeches adapted to, and reflecting, their own character: and
we can now see how to compose our speeches so as to adapt both them and ourselves to
our audiences.")
35.
Aristotle spoke of the universals, CATEGORIES AND DE INTERPRErATIONE § 2a352b7 (J.L.Ackrill trans., 1963), while the Stoics described in more detail the preconceptions
known as the koinai ennoia. See also DIOGENES LAERTIUS, LIvEs OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS
§ 7.39 (Robert Drew Hicks, trans., 1938).
36.
See section IV, infra.
37.
See Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and TrialJudges, 50
TEx. L. REV. 629,644 (1972).
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prosecutor for an implicitly racist argument is very low, given that sua
sponte reprimands for argumentative misconduct are very rare indeed; and
because the defense bar is very wary of making any objections during
prosecutors' summations:
Remember that interruptions of your opponent's argument
are to be avoided unless he says something outrageous ....
Nothing is so devastating as to have the court say, "Well, Mr.
Geoghan, there is a certain leeway allowed in summation; your
' 38
objection is overruled."
The advice not to object during a prosecutor's summation seems
sound, given that the remedy for such objections is illusory. Empirical
studies have shown that a detailed curative instruction from the trial judge
to the jury only serves to emphasize the improper consideration in the
jurors' minds, increasing the likelihood that they will consider what the
judge has told them not to, owing to psychological reactance.39 Since
"[m]ost trial judges are leary [sic] of sua sponte interventions," the defense
counsel's failure to object "usually precludes a curative instruction,
a
4
warning about further remarks, or some form of amelioration. 0
The only adequate forum for a defendant prejudiced by a racist
summation to raise this claim is the court of appeal, since the defense at
trial is unlikely to broach the issue of racist argumentation for fear of aggravating the injury. Should a defendant subjected to a prosecutor's
prejudicial summation raise that issue in her appeal, she will discover that
the risk of reversal is directly proportional to the transparency of the racist
argumentation in the closing argument. This is because the courts have
held that the Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated by summations
where the courts find merely a logically irrelevant "negative characterization of the defendant," 4 ' rather than an appeal to the jurors' racial
prejudice, and yields only a deferential standard of review using the Darden standard. 2
Even if the prosecutor's references to the defendant are held to be
"abusive, opprobrious, or otherwise unflattering," the trial court's ruling
on the negative characterization of the defendant is subject only to a deferential standard of review, as long as the references are deemed not to
have a racial dimension, which is usually the finding when they are not
38.

William E X. Geoghan Jr., The Plaintiff's Approach in ClosingArgument, in PERSUA(Grace W Holmes ed., 1992).
39.
Sharon Wolf & David Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of
JudicialAdmonishment to Disregardon the Judgments of Mock Jurors.7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
205 (1977). On the notion of psychological reactance generally, see JACK W BREHM, A
SION: THE KEY TO SUCCESS INTRIAL 68

THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE

40.
41.
42.

(1966).

Arrieta-Agressot v. United States, 3 E3d 525, 528 (1st Cir. 1993).
See Darden v.Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
See id. (Darden standard discussed infra, p. 23).
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overtly racist.43 When asserting a claim of (presumptively non-racist)
prosecutorial misconduct during summation, "the defendants-appellants
face a heavy burden, because the misconduct alleged must be so severe
and significant as to result in the denial of their right to a fair trial."" The
appellant must then demonstrate that the abuse was so extreme as to constitute a violation of the guarantee of due process found in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
Under Darden, "The relevant question is whether the prosecutors'
comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
5
conviction a denial of due process", 4s-a
very difficult demonstration to
make. Under the Darden standard, a court will not reverse a conviction
unless the defendant shows a denial of due process, even if the court finds
that the prosecutions' prejudicial arguments were deplorable and unprofessional. Although judges can voice criticism in censorious dictum, this is
largely ineffective, "since prosecutors will gladly pay the small price of a
ritualistic verbal spanking" in order to win their cases.46
Conversely, when, as in McCleskey, the court determines that the argumentation is racist, rather than merely opprobrious, the relevant
standard is based on the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws,
rather than the right to due process-the former providing a far more
43.
Darden, 477 U.S. at 181; see also Debra. T. Landis, ProsecutorsAppeal in Criminal
Case to Racial, National, or Religious Prejudice as Groundfor Mistrial, New Trial, Reversal, Or
Vacation Of Sentence--Modern Cases, 70 A.L.R.4th ed., 664 5 2 (2003).
44.
United States v. Locascio, 6 E3d 924, 945 (2d Cit. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S.
1070 (1994).
45.
Darden,477 U.S. at 183 (holding that the appellant's "trial was not perfect-few
are-but neither was it fundamentally unfair.").
46.
United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 E2d 631, 661 (2d. Cir. 1946)
(Frank, J. dissenting). As Judge Jerome Frank noted, prosecutors are unfazed by even the
stinging criticism from the appellate courts if the conviction is permitted to stand:
This court has several times used vigorous language in denouncing government counsel for such conduct as that of the United States Attorney here.
But, each time, it has said that, nevertheless, it would not reverse. Such an attitude of helpless piety is, I think, undesirable. It means actual condonation of
counsel's alleged offense, coupled with verbal disapprobation. If we continue
to do nothing practical to prevent such conduct, we should cease to disapprove it. For otherwise it will be as if we declared in effect, "Government
attorneys, without fear of reversal, may say just about what they please in addressing juries, for our rules on the subject are pretend-rules. If prosecutors
win verdicts as a result of'disapproved' remarks, we will not deprive them of
their victories; we will merely go through the form of expressing displeasure.
The deprecatory words we use in our opinions on such occasions are purely
,ceremonial.'" Government counsel, employing such tactics, are the kind
who, eager to win victories, will gladly pay the small price of a ritualistic
verbal spanking. The practice of this court-recalling the bitter tear shed by
the Walrus as he ate the oysters-breeds a deplorably cynical attitude towards
the judiciary.
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generous amount of legal support to this claim of error. 47 Following that
decision,4"courts must consider racist argumentation prima facie evidence
of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. As such, the burden shifts to
the government to demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 49 under the standard adopted by the Supreme Court in
0
Chapman v. California."
The McCleskey standard is the most searching
standard of review applied to prosecutorial summations by appellate
courts. The defendant who can point directly to the prosecutor's use of
racist argumentation at his trial can make a case for reversal that is far less
complicated than that of the defendant who can only demonstrate that
the prosecutor used an ostensibly race-neutral "characterization."
Thus, the question of whether or not the courts have created an effective disincentive to prosecutors tempted to make racist summations
depends on whether or not the appellate courts will take notice of implicitly racist argumentation. Should they consider the arguments racist,
they are compelled to apply the Chapman standard of appellate review;
conversely, if the courts turn a blind eye to racist allusions, the burden will
be put on the defendant to make the near-impossible showing mandated
in Darden. Appellate judges' ability and willingness to recognize racism
will determine whether the victims of racist argumentation will receive
meaningful appellate review of this injustice.
III. A

CASE STUDY ON WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURTS

CAN RECOGNIZE IMPLICIT RACISM: STATE V. ALLEN

Wanda Jean Allen's case demonstrates not only the inability of the
appellate courts to notice prosecutors' use of implicitly racist arguments,
but also shows that the damage inflicted upon the defendant lasts long
after the trial, as the prosecutor's definition of the defendant lessens the
1
likelihood that any other body will exercise mercy."
Allen's trial was such
a historic event-murder trials involving women defendants often arebut the salaciousness of the media coverage of her trial, appeals and

47.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279, 309 & n.30 (1987).
48.
While McCleskey involved a regrettable analysis of the racial dimensions of the
application of the death penalty, the Court reasoned on the issue of racism in society in a
thoughtful manner.
49.
See, e.g., Bains v. Cambra, 204 F3d 964 (9th Cir. 2000).
50.
See generally Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), modified by Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 617 (1993).
51.
I learned of Wanda Jean Allen's case as a result of attending the Ninth Annual
Derrick Bell Lecture at New York University School of Law, Nov. 4, 2004, where Kendall
Thomas discussed it extensively. I am indebted to him for hearing his thoughts on the case
and its importance.
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execution, stoked by homophobia and racism, was an extreme example.1
The saturation coverage of her trial meant that public consciousness of
the prosecutor's theory of the case endured long after the trial, lasting until the point when a poor, Black lesbian, suffering from borderline mental
retardation, was executed for a non-premeditated murder.
Allen's case demonstrates how the ultimate effect of racist argumentation lead to the ultimate penalty-capital punishment. Since a
conviction in a capital trial can be a key personal victory for a prosecutor,
the temptation to mobilize racism within the summation is particularly
grave, as Allen's case (and many others described infra) point out. However,
while Allen's case provides a particularly egregious example of the effect
of racist argumentation, it allows for a case study that provides an excellent introduction into the methods of covertly "defining" a Black
defendant with rhetorical figures, and why these figures of definition often evade meaningful appellate review.

A. The Context of Wanda Jean Allen's Case
Allen's failure to define herself in the eyes of her audience as a worthy object of compassion is impossible to explain without understanding
how she had been previously defined, and how this enduring definition of
Allen as unworthy and less than human had been accomplished. Wanda
Jean Allen's clemency hearing, as captured on film, is a heart-rending
scene. Allen appears on the screen, a Black woman handcuffed and wearing a prison jumpsuit, with only her face and hair (and the small cross
hanging from her neck) to distinguish her from any other inmate. She
leaned forward to the microphone to deliver her appeal for mercy, to ask
to be spared. In her remarks, Allen identified herself as a repentant person
whose life was worth sparing, interweaving a religiously inspired narrative
of worthiness and stating that she was a "child of God." The stress of the
moment bore heavily upon Allen, who in the end could only fall back on
repeating the simplest and most personal supplication, delivered in a
whisper: "Please let me live. Please let me live."' 3 Her attempt to persuade
the clemency board to spare her life was not successful, and the state of
Oklahoma executed Wanda Jean Allen on January 11,2001 .$
Even knowing that Allen had taken a life, it is difficult to imagine
how anyone could harden his or her heart and ignore her plea for mercy.
First, Allen's case involved circumstances that usually lead to a charge of
manslaughter, since she was so emotionally disturbed that she attacked her
52.

See, e.g., Bobby Ross,Jr., Wanda Jean Allen Executed, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 12,

2001, at Al.
53.
THE EXECTION or WANDA JEAN ALiN (Moxie Firecracker Films 2002) [hereinafter "EXEcUTION"].
54.
Nation in Brief, WASH. PosTJan 12,2001, at A26.
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former lover in the parking lot of a police station. Second, there was also
ample evidence that Allen, whose limited education was never an issue at
her trial, was of an intelligence level which many experts considered to be
at the threshold of mental retardation. This mitigating evidence was repeatedly raised, but to no avail. Finally, Allen had formulated the
rhetorical structure of her supplication well, in view of her mostly Christian audience,"5 since she invoked themes such
as forgiveness, redemption,
6
and a personal relationship with the divinity.
Wanda Jean Allen's rhetoric was, in its own way, as sophisticated as
any other example that this Article will discuss. It had the potential to be
a successful communication because it was well suited to its audience. Allen's words seek to call to the minds of the Christian members of her
audience numerous Bible passages, in particular those involving the duty
of forgiveness and the divinity's concern for the lives of every being in
57
creation. Since rhetorical theorists have long considered adaptation to
the beliefs of one's audience a cornerstone of rhetorical success, it is difficult to imagine how Allen's appeal could have fallen so flat, especially
given the degree to which Karla Faye Tucker's religious orations had
struck a chord with the public. Nevertheless, she failed to secure either
the support of her ostensible audience (the clemency board), or the vital
moral support of the opinion leaders in Oklahoma's Black churches, who
could have placed the governor under considerable pressure to, at the very
least, delay the execution.

55.
ExEcuTION, supra note 53.
56.
Oklahomans are more likely than the citizens of any other state to profess the
Christian faith. Furthermore, Christian Oklahomans are far more likely to be adherents of
denominations that demand that their adherents consider the articles of their faith as central to every aspect of their lives, and not merely as a compartmentalized set of ideals that
exist in parallel to one's secular values. See generally A. 0. Turner, Religion, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OKLAHoMA HISTORY AND CuLrTum, http://www.ok-history.mus.ok.us/enc/
relig.htm.
Oklahoma's religious profile varies markedly from national norms.The state's
residents identify themselves as Southern Baptist almost seven times more often than other Americans, while Churches of Christ, Methodist, Pentecostal,
and Holiness groups are also much more common in Oklahoma than elsewhere. Correspondingly, Oklahomans are much less often associated with
either mainstream Protestant churches, Roman Catholicism, or Judaism.
Id.
57.
See, e.g., Matthew 10:29; Matthew 5:38-48, Matthew 5:1-7:29, 1 Corinthians 11:31,
Ezekiel 33:11 (New American Bible for Catholics).
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B. The Prosecutor's Use of Implicitly Racist Rhetoric
to Define WandaJeanAllen in his Summation
Wanda Jean Allen alluded to the source of the barriers to her successfil redefinition of herself in the eyes of the public during her
clemency hearing. When she said "What I want you to know is that I'm
not a monster ...I am not what the prosecution say I am","' she recognized that her primary task in defining herself at that hearing was to
overcome the way the prosecution had defined her at her trial. The prosecutor had seized upon the key opportunity at trial to use the rhetorical
figures of definition to brand Wanda Jean Allen as a monster-during his
summation.
In his closing argument at Allen's trial, the prosecutor twice drew
parallels between Allen and animals: first, to a snake,5 9and second, to an
ape. 60 The trial court overruled the defense's objections twice, after the
prosecutor denied that he was comparing her to an animal. 61 The second
of these comparisons is especially troubling. The prosecution published to
the jury a greeting card with a picture of a gorilla on the cover, with a
caption that read "patience my ass, I'm going to kill something., 62 While
the text of the card, and what Allen had written within the card, was
plainly relevant evidence of motive; showing the picture to the jury
served no purpose other than to associate Allen in the minds of the jurors
with a picture of an aggressive gorilla. While showing the card to the jury,
"[t]he prosecutor said 'that's Wanda Jean Allen in a nutshell ,63 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found no error, and disavowed any
racist intent on the part of the prosecutor: "Appellant's attorney objected
to the comment, saying the prosecutor implied Appellant was an ape. The trial
court overruled the objection, observing she did not take it that way. In
light of the entire comment, neither do we. 64

ExEcUrIoN, supra note 53.
59.
It appears from the appellate opinions that the prosecution made reference to
the folk parable of the possum and the snake: Once upon a time, a possum came upon a
poisonous snake frozen in the snow. He took the snake home and nursed it back to health.
One day the snake bit him on the cheek. As he lay dying, he asked the snake, "Why have
you done this to me?" And the snake answered, "Don't complain, you knew I was a snake
when you found me." This parable can be found in many forms in many media, but it is
retold most memorably in Oliver Stone's NATuRAL BoRN KILLERS (Warner Bros. 1994).
60.
Id.
61.
Allen v. State, 871 P2d 79, 97 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
62.
Id.
63.
Id. (emphasis added).
64.
Id. (emphasis added).

58.
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C. Wanda Jean Allen's Case Illustrates the Appellate Courts' Failure to
Recognize Even the Most Thinly Veiled Implicit Appeals to Racism
How could any court fail to note the racism inherent in comparing
an African American woman to an ape, in claiming that her very essence
was identical to that of a gorilla? An argument can be made that the failure of the trial and appellate courts to address this issue, which was
preserved by a contemporaneous objection-or even to note any latent
racism in a prosecutor's summation-illustrates that in practice there is no
meaningful check on the use of implicit racism in closing arguments. This
Article contains an extensive catalogue of similar failures, beginning with
an analysis of the appellate review of Wanda Jean Allen's trial. Because
they failed to take note of the racist dimension of the rhetoric that the
prosecutor directed at her during his summation, the appellate court
merely applied the Darden standard, which relates only to opprobrious
language, and not the McCleskey standard that is appropriate to racist
summations.
In the unpublished memorandum order affirming the district court's
denial of Allen's request for a writ of habeas corpus, the panel of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals characterized the prosecution's comparison of
Allen to an ape as "improper name calling., 6 The court clearly noted that
there was an improper purpose at work, namely that the prosecutor had
intended to disparage Allen in the eyes of the jury. However, the court
ignored the racism inherent in comparing a Black woman to a gorilla,
despite the fact that the term "ape" (or "black ape,"-note that the gorilla
in the photo was a black ape, since all gorillas have fur of this color) is a
known racial slur.66
Because of the failure to acknowledge the prosecutor's racist intent,
the court was free to ignore its duty to engage in the searching review the
Supreme Court mandated as required by the Fourteenth Amendment in
McCleskey v. Kemp.67 Accordingly, the court applied the Darden standard,68
reasoning that: "[a] prosecutor's improper comment or argument, not implicating any specific constitutional right, [e.g. those of the equal protection
clause] will require reversal of a state conviction only where the remark
sufficiently infected the trial so as to make it fundamentally unfair and,

65.

Allen v. Massie, No. 98-6340,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 316 at *15'(10th Cir.Janu-

ary 11,2000).
66.
Kortan v. CaliforniaYouth Auth., 217 F3d 1104,1121 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2000), see
also RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON 229 (Harper Bros. Publishers 1st ed. 1940), MARGARET
MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND 597 (Scribner 16th ed. 1996).
67.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279 (1987); See also United States v. Soto, 988 E2d 1548,
1559 (10th Cir. 1993) ("It is beyond peradventure that the Constitution prohibits racially
biased prosecutorial arguments.").
68.
See Donnely v. DeChristofioro, 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
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therefore, a denial of due process."' 9 No court ever addressed the racist
argumentation at Allen's trial in terms of equal protection. Therefore, the
definition of Allen as a brutal beast undeserving of mercy persisted long
after trial-until after her denial of clemency, when she died after lethal
injection in the Oklahoma State Penitentiary.
Given the failure of the courts to learn how to recognize implicit
racism, this Article addresses the challenge of demonstrating the racist dimension of these summations to appellate courts in a way that they
cannot ignore, and that will help to build a jurisprudence that routinely
subjects implicitly racist summations to the McCleskey standard of equal
protection analysis. This endeavor has two main prongs. First, the Article
must describe the preconceptions in the minds of jurors that allow for the
prosecutors' implicit appeals to racism. This Article includes a demonstration of the fact that these stereotypes, based on racist caricatures, are
common, current, and a strong motivator to action, so that even the subtlest appeals can succeed in awakening a powerful racist response from the
jury. Second, the Article illustrates the rhetorical techniques that prosecutors can use to elicit a racist response from the jury, one that defines the
defendant in the negative terms of the racial caricatures about African
Americans, that create strong animosity towards Black defendants and
foreclose a rational consideration of the evidence against them.
IV

UNDERSTANDING THE RAW MATERIAL FOR THE RACIST DEFINITION
OF BLACK DEFENDANTS:THE BRUTE CARICATURE

Before discussing the specific rhetorical techniques that make it possible for a prosecutor to call up racist stereotypes in the minds of the
jurors, it must be determined whether the preconditions for this type of
rhetorical action exist. The preliminary question is whether there is a
stereotype of Blacks already existing in the minds of most White jurors;
one that would be useful to prosecutors should they evoke this mental
model with the figures of definition.7" The answer is an emphatic yes.

69.
Allen, supra note 65, at 16.
70.
While it is beyond the scope of this Article, it is also indisputable that many
racist and sexist stereotypes exist in the minds of jurors. That said, it cannot be asserted
with certainty whether these prejudices would serve as a motivating force for conviction
in the same way that the stereotypes of Blacks do, and thus whether there is a similarly
powerful incentive for prosecutors to deploy argumentation that elicits these mental models of women and other minorities in the minds ofjurors.
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A. The Nature and Power of the Brute Caricatureand
its Ability to Elicit a Strong Racist Response
The image of the African American man as a "Black brute" was proliferated (by means of cartoons, yellow journalism and penny-dreadful
novels, amongst other media) 71 extensively from the time of Reconstruction through the Twentieth Century. "The brute caricature portrays Black
men as innately savage, animalistic, destructive, and criminal-deserving
punishment, maybe death. This brute is a fiend, a sociopath, an anti-social
menace. 72 The political purpose of the characterization was to invoke fear
on the part of the White audience, and to justify repressive measures towards Black Americans. The contemporary existence and political utility
of this stereotype is also beyond question, as studies have revealed that
when a news story describes a violent crime without mentioning the race
of the perpetrator, a statistically significant majority
of White readers
74
automatically infer that the criminal was Black.
When asked directly whether they believed that Blacks as a group
were more prone to violence and hostility, one study shows' s that a majority of White respondents agree that Blacks are both hostile and
aggressive. 76 Further questioning of the respondents indicated that most
had not themselves, nor had their acquaintances, been the victims of violent crime; it is clear that this association of Black people with violent
criminality is founded upon a deeply rooted and persistent ideological
belief."" Since this stereotype is associated with fear and loathing, it is
likely to be a strong motivating force, motivating a fear response when
activated by external stimuli, such as a racist summation during a criminal
trial. Furthermore, countless narratives volunteered by African Americans
about how Whites respond to them fearfully-merely because a White

71.
See Marion Riggs, ETHNIC NOTIONS (California Newsreel 1987). ETHNIC NoTIONS was a groundbreaking and now classic documentary that traces the evolution of the
archetypes of deeply-rooted racist stereotypes throughout American history.
72.
David Pilgrim, The Brute Caricature, http://www.ferris.edu/news/imcrow/
brute/.
73.
See generally ETHNIC NOTIONS, supra note 71.
74.
See S. Plous & T.Williams, Racial stereotypes from the days of American slavery: a
continuing legacy,J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 25, 795-817; See also TEUN A. VAN DiJK, RACISM
AND THE PRESS (1991).

75.
See the 1991 Race and Politics Study, undertaken by researchers from the University of California, available at http://sda.berkeley.edu/cgi-bin/hsda?harcsrc+natlrace.
76.
Jon Hurwitz et al., Racial stereotypes and whites'politicalviews of blacks in the context
of welfare and crime, 41 AM.J. POL. Sci. 30, 35 (1997).
77.
For a description of the cognitive role played by ideological beliefs, see generally
TEUN A. VAN DIJK, IDEOLOGY: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (1998).
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person associates the Black person with a violent stereotype of African
Americans-also support this empirical conclusion."'
B. The Vitality of the Brute Stereotype in New Guises, and
its ContinuingEffect as a Strong Motivating Force
The recent history of race relations in America has also proven that
the stereotype of the "Black brute" continues to have a powerful motivating effect. White residents who fled the Northern cities for the suburbs
during the 1960s and 1970s, withdrawing their children from public
schools in favor of private educational institutions were not, in the main,
motivated by a fear of racial 'pollution', but largely by fear of violent
crime.79 Most recently, hysteria about Black crime has been sparked by the
depiction of what John Dilulo, the former White House Director of Faith
Based and Community Initiatives had described as "thickening ranks of
juvenile 'superpredators'-radically impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters ...[who] murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs,join
gun-toting gangs and create serious communal disorders."80 Dilulio's
theories revolutionized policing in the nation's inner cities, and the everincreasing number of minority youth arrests swelled the population of
America's prisons to a record-breaking degree."' These social effects are
not explained by any credible theory that does not contain the premise
that irrational fear of Black criminality (and increasingly, by fear of Latino
and other minority youth, the White vision of whom is constructed by
use of stereotypes originally applied only to African Americans) is a strong
motivator of White Americans' social behavior.
On the basis of this evidence, it is possible to conclude that not only
is the stereotype of the Black brute current within American society, but
that in all its iterations, including those that serve to "racially construct"
Latino and other minority youth, it has been proven to be one of the
most enduring and powerful stereotypes in the nation's history. It has
catalyzed social transformation repeatedly, and served as a central premise
for major social policy initiatives. No stereotype that motivated such
wide-ranging action could be absent from the discursive and ideological

Patricia J. Williams, The Death of the Profane, in THE ALCHEMY O RACE AND
44-51 (1991).
79.
See D. Garth Taylor, Housing, Neighborhoods, and Race Relations: Recent Survey
Evidence, 441 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 26, 35 (1979).
80.
WILLIAM BENNETT, JOHN DIIuLIo & JOHN WATERS, BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY... AND How TO WIN THE WAR ON CRIME AND DRUGS (1996) (emphasis added).
81.
See generally Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial
Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249 (1998).
78.
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frameworks of social meaning possessed by the majority ofWhite Ameri82
cans.
Despite the prevalence and explanatory power of the brute caricature, it can rarely explain an unjust jury verdict in the absence of
prosecutorial misconduct. In order for a stereotype to motivate a jury
verdict, a speaker must elicit it; unless the audience possesses the prejudices at the conscious level, rather than predominantly at the subconscious
level, as many studies suggest is far more common. 3 Recent developments
in cognitive theory (known as the data-delivery model of stereotypes)
hold that a stereotype, which lies latent in the mind of its adherent, does
not have a force of its own. The appropriate stimulus is often required to
elicit the stereotype; the existence of stereotypes or caricatures in the
mind of
84the audience is often not enough to produce the motivating response. Rather, the speaker may need to shape his discourse to call forth
these cognitive constructs in the minds of the listeners.
V RHETORICAL THEORY DEMONSTRATES

CAN BE

How

THE BRUTE STEREOTYPE

INVOKED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO RACE

The question that this Article must answer is whether a prosecutor
can covertly evoke the stereotype of the Black brute without directly referring to the race of the defendant, in order to escape searching appellate
review. In addition to the evidence provided by the case study of Wanda
Jean Allen, social science research suggests that this should be eminently
possible, since mostWhites associate violent criminality with Black people
when the story does not identify the race of the perpetrator.58 However,
here we are concerned not with a mere stereotype of Black criminality,
but of Black brutality-and whether prosecutors can rhetorically associate
the defendant with the particular stereotype of animalistic ferocity without making use of explicitly racist language. As this Article will show,
classical rhetorical theory demonstrates how this is possible. Further,
analysis of cases where Black defendants have been subjected to argumentative misconduct, such as the trial of Wanda Jean Allen, prove that
numerous American prosecutors understand how to make the leap from
theory to practice. There are many examples of summation misconduct,
detailed extensively in this Article infra, which show that prosecutors
82.
See generally Teun A. van Dijk, The Ideology And Discourse Of Modern Racism, in
DISCOURSE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (1998).
83.
See Hurwitz, supra note 76.
84.
See Patricia Devine, Stereotypes and prejudice:Their automatic and controlled components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 15 (1989). It is for this reason that a racist
political campaign must actively call forth the stereotype in order to motivate voting behavior, for instance by use of the "Willie Horton" television commercial, rather than
merely relying on voters to vote on the basis of the latent stereotype.
85.
See vAN DtJK, supra note 74. See also supra note 82.
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know how to implicitly associate a Black defendant with the brute caricature in a subtle, yet highly effective, manner.
A. Four Figures of Definition Used to Evoke the Brute Caricature
A prosecutor who wishes to implicitly define the defendant as a
Black brute might use one or more of four distinct rhetorical figures to
accomplish this goal. Systrophe, antonomasia,circumitio, and paralipsis are subtle techniques that are not widely known, and thus their deployment in
summations is less likely to invite reversal by the appellate courts reviewing a claim of racist argumentation. However, both classical rhetoric and
modern persuasion theory agree that indirect approaches to persuasion
are as effective as the more direct methods.
Aristotle, the father of systematic rhetorical theory, argued that the
central unit of rhetoric was not the syllogism (which was the basic element of logic and dialectic) but rather the enthymeme, which was a
syllogism with an unstated premise, usually the conclusion. The reason for
the omission of the conclusion is that when all the premises of the syllogism (e.g. Socrates is a man, all men are mortal) are stated, the audience
does not have to engage with the speaker; when a premise is unstated,
(e.g. the truism that men suffer from mortality) the audience has to become an active listener to participate in the construction of meaning, to
retrace the logic that leads to the conclusion (that Socrates will die).86 This
technique is an effective means of encouraging not only active listening,
but also of promoting persuasion.
Drawing on recent research in persuasion theory, one trial advocacy
text states that "the more alert or bright people are, the more they want to
draw inferences rather than have them drawn by a speaker. Much more
important, however, is the fact that when individuals draw the final inference (i.e., to the conclusion) they are more likely to be persuaded toward
the general case or thesis. 87 Both ancient and contemporary rhetorical
theory demonstrate that indirect appeals to racism are likely to be effective, especially those orations that connect the target of the racism with a
virulent and powerful stereotype. The cases detailed below, in the four
sections that explain particular rhetorical techniques of indirectness, provide ample evidence of the efficacy of these figures of definition.
1. Systrophe: Defining by Reference to Central Attributes
The first and most effective rhetorical figure that a prosecutor can
use to surreptitiously define the defendant as a Black brute is systrophe. To
86.

See M. E Burnyeat, Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion, in ARisToTLE'S

RHFromc: PHILOSOPHIcAL ESSAYS 3-55 (David J. Furley & Alexander Nehemas, eds. 1994).
87.
CRAwoR, supra note 24, at 277.
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define someone by systrophe as being in the class of brutes, the speaker
need only describe many of their actions in terms of the characteristic
qualities of that caricature. For example, a prosecutor could describe the
defendant's actions as animalistic, brutal, and impulsive in order to invoke
the Brute caricature. This will bring forth the caricature in the minds of
the jurors whose mental models88 of Black people include this stereotype.
There are also numerous examples of cases where prosecutors' summations mobilized this figure of definition, yet the courts of appeal did not
recognize the existence and function of this rhetorical device, which illustrate the need for systematic interdisciplinary study of this problem.
A comprehensive list of cases in which the prosecutor attempts to
describe a defendant as having brutish characteristics, and thus attempts to
establish that the defendant belongs to the class of those "marked by animal traits and by a lack of man's dignity or refinement", 9 would be too
long to attempt in this Article. 0 This Article will instead describe some
paradigmatic examples of the courts' failure to recognize the prejudicial
impact of systrophe that defines a Black defendant as a brute, thereby precluding searching appellate review of their claim of error.
Willie Jasper Darden's case involves a prominent use of this figure.
Darden was an African American man convicted of killing a White
woman by an all-White jury, and subsequently executed in 1998, after the
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the denial of his habeas
corpus petition. Darden's appellate attorneys extensively detailed that "the
prosecution's calculated, unprofessional and inflammatory closing argument rob[bed] the determination of petitioner's guilt of the fundamental
fairness required by due process" in the brief they presented to the Supreme Court. 1 The inflammatory remarks that Darden described
correspond with what a rhetorician would identify as a completed systrophe, one that defined him as a brute. The prosecutor at his trial called
Darden an "animal" who should not "be turned loose" by the jurors, and
stated that during his imprisonment, he should "have a leash on" when
allowed outside of his cell. He described Darden as deserving death, and
indeed, that he relished that vision, hoping that he "could see [Darden]
sitting here with no face, blown away by a shotgun."92

88.
See generally Eldar Shafir and Amos Tversky, Thinking Through Uncertainty: Nonconsequential Reasoning and Choice, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 449 (1992).
89.

THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE THEsAuRus, 99 (Ed. 1988).

90.
See Thomas M. Fleming, Negative Characterization or Description of Defendant, by
Prosecutor During Summation of CriminalTrial, as Groundfor Reversal, New Trial, or Mistrial-Modern Cases, 88 A.L.R.4th 8, §§ 62-90 (collecting cases where defendants compared to
various animals).
91.
Petitioner's Brief, Darden v.Wainwright, No. 1985 WL 669179, at 21 (S. Ct. Oct
28, 1985)(No. 85-5319).
92.
Id.

MichiganJournalof Race & Law

[VOL. 11:325

In an opinion that constitutes a dramatic failure of the courts to acknowledge the racist dimension of inflammatory prosecutorial
argumentation, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he prosecutors' argument
did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor did it implicate other
specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to
remain silent.9' 3 Justice Blackmun wrote in his dissent that the majority
opinion "reveals a Court willing to tolerate not only imperfection but a
level of fairness and reliability so low it should make conscientious prosecutors cringe ' ' 9 4 and that the Court failed to confront the true issue raised
by the summation, which was nothing "but a relentless and single-minded
attempt to inflame the jury."9' Unfortunately, not even the dissent took
note of the fact that by describing Darden's actions in a way that defined
him as a savage, unthinking animal deserving death, the prosecution was
calling to the jurors' minds the brute caricature. No Justice noted that this
was an attempt to inject racism into the trial, in violation of the defendant's rights under the equal protection clause.
There are also numerous examples of prosecutors accomplishing the
systrophe more economically, to better persuade any reviewing court that
they should consider any slur against a Black defendant a harmless "passing remark." 6 One telling example was exposed when Johnny Johnson?7
appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia for habeas corpus relief, pointing out that among other errors committed at his trial, he was denied due
process and equal protection when a prosecutor at trial described him,
among other inflammatory comparisons, as "a mad dog."" This characterization implicated all three of the key definitions of the brute: a mad
dog is an animal that is also brutally violent, incapable of thought, and acts
completely on impulse.
The Supreme Court of Georgia, 9 the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia' 0 and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit'"' failed to take note of the racial significance in these remarks.
Nor did they recognize how the prosecution provided the cognitive basis
93.
Darden, 477 U.S. at 182.
94.
Id. at 189 (Blackmun,J.) (dissenting).
95.
Id. at 191.
96.
The Supreme Court created the prototype for this type of dismissive harmless
error analysis in Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974) (holding that the inflammatory statement was "but one moment of an extended trial.").
97.
It is impossible to tell from the appellate record that Johnson is African American; however, his mug shot establishes that he is Black. See Bill Torpy, Georgia's Death Row:
Waiting to Die, ATLANTA J. AN,1D CONST., Nov. 17, 1996, at G8.
98.
Johnson v. Zandt, 295 S.E.2d 63, 69 (Ga. 1982) ("Petitioner charges that the
prosecutor made improper and inflammatory remarks in his closing argument-among
them an assertion comparing Johnson's behavior to that of a mad dog..
99.
Id.
100.
Johnson v. Kemp, 585 E Supp. 1496 (S.D. Ga. 1984).
101.
Johnson v. Kemp, 759 F2d 1503 (11 th Cir. 1985).
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for the jurors' connection between the defendant and the brute caricature
with the systrophe. Since there was ample evidence that Johnson had not
1 2
killed the victim, but rather that his accomplice had shot the decedent, 1
the prosecutor had made his case by rhetorically linking Johnson (via the
systrophe) to a class of Black brutes, who, like mad dogs, deserve to be put
down. The jury subsequently sentenced Johnson to death.0 3 If the courts
fail to recognize the utility of this rhetorical figure to define defendants
by association to the caricature, it is likely that this technique will continue to be used to a racist effect in prosecutors' summations.
2. Antonomasia: Defining by Reference to a Paradigmatic Example
The second rhetorical figure that prosecutors can use to define the
defendant in a surreptitious manner by association with the brute caricature is antononasia. This rhetorical figure involves a substitution of a
proper name into a phrase that the speaker uses to define the subject's
actions, in order to associate the qualities of the person who bears that
name with the subject of definition."' In this manner, the speaker can link
the person she is trying to define with the class of people represented by
the substituted proper name. An example demonstrates how this figure
operates: by saying "there is much of Cicero in this letter" one defines the
writer as an eloquent person, as many consider Cicero to be the paragon
of elegant Latin. Prosecutors have used this figure in their summations to
define criminal defendants, in terms that are as derogatory as the comparison to Cicero is laudatory.
During a death penalty trial, a Marion County (Indiana) Assistant
District Attorney used antonomasia to define Tommie Smith as a brute,
saying in his closing argument that Smith had decided "to play Superfly
and shoot [the victim] where he lay. ' 05 (Superfly 10 6 is one of the most

widely known cinematic exemplars of this racist caricature°-a cocaine
dealer with "a plan to stick it to the man. 10 8 By describing the fatal assault
as something Superfly would do, the prosecutor defined Smith as having a

102.
Id. at 1505.
103.
Johnson v.State, 242 Ga. 649, 649 (1978).
104.
See QUINILLIAN, THE ORATOR's EDUCATION § 8.6.29-30 (Donald A. Russell
trans., 2002).
105.
Smith v. Indiana, 516 N.E.2d 1055, 1064 (1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934 (1988)
internal citations omitted).
106.
See SUPERFLY (Warner Brothers 1972).
107.
See, e.g., Torsten Shafer, Afro-Amerikane im Amerikanishchen Fihn,at http://www.
google.com/search?q+cache:CwzkMzrZFVwJ:www-user.uni-bremen.de/'-torstens/afi.o.
html+%2Bsuperfly+%22black+brute%22&hl=en last accessed Nov. 24,2004.
108.
SUPERFLY is an example of "blaxploitation" films in which filmmakers often
made use of racist images to challenge prejudicial notions, although not always successfully.
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violent and impulsive character, along with all the other hallmarks of the
brutes that the jurors might have thought Superfly exemplified.
The Supreme Court of Indiana failed to notice that the comparison
drawn between Smith and Superfly elicited a racist response, thereby
showing how successful this rhetorical figure can be, both in defining the
defendant and in avoiding any meaningful appellate review. Despite
Smith's forcefully raised claim on appeal that "the State's final argument
was calculated to inflame the passions of the jury through appeals to racial
prejudice," the court did not find the reference to Superfly to be racist,
since "[t]hese remarks are not inherently racial comments."'" Alternatively,
prosecutors have chosen other figures (both historical and fictional) to
serve as the paragon of brutality used to define the defendant by use of
antonomasia.Lately, prosecutors have cast O.J. Simpson in this role," since
Simpson has become an avatar of the Brute caricature in the White community. Antonomasia using Simpson's name in prosecutors' summations is
likely to continue to be a particularly effective means of creating an association in jurors' minds between Black defendants with the Brute
caricature.
3. Circumitio: Defining by Reference to Shared Characteristics
While Greek rhetorical theorists like Aristotle had given names only
to rhetorical figures that were capable of clear definition, more practically
oriented Roman rhetorical theorists created names for more general
categories of effective rhetorical strategies, which were later also included
in the lists of the figures which they compiled. One of these general techniques, first described in the anonymously written Rhetorica ad Herenium,
was circumitio.1" This figure involves "talking around something ... [so as]
109.
Smith, 516 N.E.2d at 1064. (emphasis added). Of course, the real issue was
whether in this context the comparison was designed to elicit a racist response, not whether
every comparison to Superfly would be racist across all contexts.
110.
See State v.Taylor, 650 N.W2d 190, 208 (Minn. 2002)
[A]ppelant now argues that by mentioning 0. J. Simpson, the prosecutor
may have caused the jury to associate appellant with the Simpson case and
that the reference may have influenced a juror who perhaps felt Simpson had
escaped liability for his alleged crimes ... we cannot conclude that the

comment warrants a new trial.
See also United States v. Papajohn, 212 E3d 1112, 1121 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that "the
prosecutor's comparison of Ms. Papajohn's defense to the defense used in the 0 .J.Simpson case, although it might better have been left unexpressed, was inflammatory to a
degree that would require a mistrial.")
111.
CICERO (sic.) (but really AuCTOR AD HERENNIUM), RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM,

4.32.43 (Harry Caplan trans., 1954.) This text was the first systematic compilation of
rhetorical techniques in Latin, it was written in the First Century of the Common Era.
The authorship of the treatise was formerly attributed to Cicero, erroneously.
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to hint at something without stating it." 1 2 This figure allows prosecutors
to make an issue of the defendant's race in the mind of the jurors without
naming it explicitly, by means of mentioning certain characteristics of the
defendant that effectively communicate his or her racial identity, such as
certain physical attributes or his or her residence in Black neighborhoods.
Courts have noted that when the race of the defendant is brought
up in order to highlight the racial difference between him or her and the
jurors, it encourages jurors to view "'colored people' as an entity separate
and apart from themselves, with the natural concomitant that the defendants would be viewed by the jury members as coming from a distinct, a
different community from themselves."" 3 As a result, jurors are less likely
to view the defendant as deserving of sympathy, or of the benefit of the
doubt that is crucial to the proper determination of guilt under the reasonable doubt standard. Nevertheless, the sheer range and variety of
arguments that make use of this figure demonstrates the near-infinite
number of ways that prosecutors can attempt to surreptitiously inject the
issue of the defendant's race into the trial" 4 without ever referring to it
explicitly, and thus evading the McCleskey standard. Prosecutors have
called attention to the Blackness of the defendant by making extraneous
references to African American hairstyles"' as a coded proxy for pointing
out a person's race, 116 the fact that a defendant lives in a segregated Black
neighborhood," 7 or to the fact that he or she professes a faith limited to
African American adherents." 8
The use of circumitio is far more inflammatory when speakers yoke
this figure to an identification of the Black community with a racial caricature. To do this, the prosecutor must identify the African Americans in a
locality as being brutes (often by defining the entire community by systrophe), and then by indirectly highlighting the Blackness of the defendant.
The prosecutor then hopes that the jury will draw the conclusion to the
enthymeme that the defendant is an animalistic, unthinking monster undeserving of pity. Prosecutors have frequently attempted to make use of

112.
Gideon. 0. Burton, Silva Rhetoricae entry for circumlocutio, available at http://
humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric/Figures/C/circumlocution.htm last accessed Nov. 29, 2004.
113.
United States ex rel. Haynes v McKendrick, 481 F2d 152, 160 (2nd Cir. 1973)
(holding that "repeated references to 'colored people' as a group trying to straighten their
hair, or wearing 'exotic hairdos,'" warranted reversal on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds) (emphasis in original).
114.
See United States v. Doe, 903 F2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
115.
McKendrick, 481 E2d at 160.
116.
See generally Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race
and Gender, 1991 Du.E LJ. 365.
117.
People v. Brown, 229 N.E.2d 922,926 (Ill. App. 1967) (holding that "[t]he reference of the prosecutrix to a 'colored neighborhood' was not prejudicial.")
118.
I.e., the Nation of Islam or other Black Muslim faiths. See, e.g., People v. Foster,
367 N.W.2d 349 (Mich. App. 1994).
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circumitio in tandem with systrophe to define the defendant and escape appellate scrutiny.
In his closing argument at the trial of Clarence Kirk (a Black defendant charged with murder), a Cook County prosecutor urged the jury to
show the Black residents of Chicago's South Side (a de facto segregated
community
where Kirk lived) that Whites would not tolerate Black
crime,1 9 arguing:
The citizens of Chicago scream, we want justice. They scream,
don't let these defendants go. They ask for law and order. Fortunately you ladies and gentlemen of the jury have a chance
that many citizens don't have. You have a chance to show a
community on the south side of Chicago
that citizens who sit
20
as jurors, don't tolerate senseless killing.1
In this argument, the prosecutor set up a dichotomy between Chicago's White and Black communities, defining the African Americans
who live on the South Side of the city as brutes who commit senseless
killing, and defining Whites as citizens, with all the connotations of civic
rectitude this term implies. Then, the prosecutor amplified the negative
characterization of the defendant's race by emphasizing his connection to
that community. The jury convicted Kirk of murder because of a confession which he contended was false and involuntary, and despite his calling
to the stand numerous African American alibi witnesses. Of course, the
rhetorical figures the prosecutor employed had already served to draw a
distinction between these witnesses and the jury, so their testimony was of
little use. Additionally, the use of circumitio allowed the prosecutor to insulate his racially inflammatory arguments from effective appellate review.
Both the Illinois Supreme Court12 ' and the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois' 22 held that the prosecutor's remarks had no
racial dimension, the latter court reasoning that "[t]he alleged racial slur is
at best ambiguous and is not
so prejudicial as to deprive the petitioner of
23
a constitutionally fair trial.'
Another way to use circumitio to set up a racist dichotomy between
the defendant and the jury can be to refer to Blacks as "them" or "they", a
technique that is so blatant as to call into question whether it is really circumlocutory at all. However, prosecutors have used these pronouns to
119.
The opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court offers strong circumstantial evidence
of this reading of the facts of the case, since it recounts how an eyewitness was able to
identify the defendant owing to his being a "Negro boy" over three months after the murder, and because of the degree of police brutality to which the defendant had been
subjected in the course of obtaining a confession. See People v. Kirk, 36 111.2d 292 (1967).
120.
United States ex rel. Kirk v. Petrelli, 331 F Supp. 792,795 (N.D.Il. 1971).
121.
Kirk, 36 Ill. 2d at 292.
122.
Petrelli, 331 F Supp. 796.
123.
Id.
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take the first step in linking circumitio to systrophe, as seen in Clarence
Kirk's case, and still evade appellate review, despite the transparency of the
reference to the Black community.
A Morgan County Alabama prosecutor made the following argument during his summation when James Gurley, a Black man, was on trial
for murder: "How do you know that they won't get up their nerve and
shoot up Second Avenue? How do you know they won't put a weapon
under their belt and shoot up an officer when he asks for their driver's
license?' 24 The Alabama Court of Appeal reasoned that they could not
determine whether "they" was being used to refer to "Negroes," despite
the race of the defendant, but reasoned that "[h]ad the instant reference
been direct, that is, had the solicitor here used an unmistakable noun such
as 'Negroes' instead of the undefined they, we should have an altogether different case before us."' 2 The fig-leaf of ambiguity provided by
the prosecutor's use of circumitio supplied the rationale for affirming Gurley's conviction.
The use of circumitio can also be particularly inflammatory when the
exposure of the proxy for the defendant's race raised by the defendant is a
quality that can, in itself, spark a racist response from the jurors. For example, the prosecutor might point to the fact that the defendant
purportedly hates White people as a way to highlight his or her Blackness,
and to cast her as unsympathetic with one solitary rhetorical stroke, by
saying: "Ladies and Gentlemen, was she so venomous because of what I
stood for? Was she so venomous because I was white? Was she so venomous
because she didn't like cops?"' 2 6 This remark was deemed ambiguous
enough to pass muster at the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
2003, at which time the court found that the statement "was not unduly
prejudicial."' 2 ' The court ignored the fact that the dichotomy that the
prosecutor set up between himself and the defendant had injected the
issue of race into the trial.
Another highly inflammatory technique used to highlight a Black
defendant's race indirectly with circumitio is to point out that his domestic,
romantic or sexual partners are White, or that his victim is White, which
of course would not bear mentioning unless the defendant is of a different
race. As Critical Race Theorists have pointed out, a 'default' condition is
rarely mentioned, since it is not even noticeable, owing to its purported
normality.2 8 An Assistant United States Attorney made the following argument at a Black defendant's trial for rape to support the conclusion that

124.
Gurley v. State, 179 So. 2d 159, 160 (Ala.App. 1965) (emphasis added).
125.
Id. (emphasis added).
126.
Evans v. Lavan, 77 Fed. Appx. 570,572 (3d Cir. 2003).
127.
Id. at 574.
128.
See generally Brant T. Lee, CriticalRace Theory: History,Evolution, and New Frontiers:
Article: The Network Economic Effects of Whiteness, 53 AM. U.L. 1Ev. 1259 (2004).

MichiganJournal of Race & Law

[VOL. 11:325

he had chosen a White woman to rape because of his preference for sexual partners of that race:
Race has nothing whatsoever to do with this case, right?
Right. We all know that the race of the people involved does
not at all dictate whether he's guilty or anything like that. I
mean, let's hope that we all feel that way, whether we are
[W]hite or [B]lack or anything. Okay? So let's clear the air that
the statement that I'm about to make has nothing whatsoever
to do-and I hope this machine hears this-has nothing whatsoever to do with race. What did we learn when we found out
that Cheryl Moore was the wife of the defendant? I suggest to
you in a non-racist way that what we found out was that Clarence McKinley Moore made a choice to be with a Caucasian
129
woman...
Clearly, the prosecution's protests are excessive. While the trial court
overruled the defendant's motion for a mistrial, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit ultimately overturned
the denial of the writ of habeas
1 30
corpus on these and other grounds.
That court's decision illustrates that some appellate panels have recognized the tremendous potential the technique of mentioning the race
of the defendant's partner has for injecting the issue of their race into the
trial in an inflammatory way. 3 Some courts have also recognized that
pointing out the defendant's race by means of an argument that is purportedly race-neutral but obviously inflammatory--such as an argument
that sexual intercourse between a White woman and Black man was rape,
since a White woman would not have consented to sexual intercourse
with a Black man-is too prejudicial to be harmless error. 3 2 However,
arguments of this type are still tolerated in some courts, both state and
federal, as numerous opinions have contained the holding that this allusion is too subtle to be considered racially prejudicial, or otherwise
harmless.' 3 3 Of all the rhetorical techniques catalogued in this Article, this
129.
Moore v. Morton, 255 E3d 95, 99 (3d. Cir. 2001)
130.
Id. at 119-20.
131.
See, e.g., United States v. Grey, 422 E2d 1043, 1045-46 (6th Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 967 (1970) (prosecutor's statement about African American defendant's
African American character witness "running around with a white go-go dancer" was
sufficiently prejudicial to warrant new trial).
132.
See, e.g., Miller v. North Carolina, 583 E2d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor's
statement that "I argue to you that the average white woman abhors anything of this type
... with a black man" in a rape case involving African American defendants was due process violation where no curative instructions were given).
133.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Gilmore, 144 E3d 513 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that prosecutor's isolated remark, in opening argument of capital murder trial, that detective would
testify that one or both of defendant's prior sexual offenses involved young White women
and knives, which allegedly appealed to racial prejudice, did not prevent defendant from
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use of circumitio is the most dangerous, and should be the first that the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal specifically proscribe. Since it allows for the
presentation of a racist argument in a way that is only partially veiled, it is
apt to evoke a strong response. Even more egregious than circumitio in this
respect is the next rhetorical figure to be discussed in this Article, since it
involves an even more bold and daring method of both establishing a racist premise and denying any intent to evoke a racist response.
4. Paralipsis:Presenting an Assertion by Way of Denial
Paralipsis13 is a method of stating a proposition while asserting that
one is passing over the subject;' for example, I would never stoop so
low as to repeat the accusations being lodged against my opponent that
he is a child molester" Naturally, by merely mentioning the assertion
while purportedly disavowing its propositional content, one brings it to
the attention of one's audience. Prosecutors have used this technique (although less frequently than the three figures discussed above) to inject the
issue of the defendant's race into the summation at trial. Prosecutors' uses
of this figure have been successful in evading meaningful appellate review,
despite the obvious reference to the defendant's race. Courts have nevertheless ignored the fact that by denying that they are making a particular
assertion; the prosecution in fact places the propositional content of that
statement before the jury. An opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeal
upholding the conviction of a Black defendant who claimed he was subjected to racist arguments during the prosecutor's summation illustrates
this point well:
Dixon, an adult Negro, was convicted of indulging in indecent
or immoral practices ... [his] argument that the Commonwealth's attorney deliberately sought in his closing argument to
prejudice the jury by asking the jury not to be harder on the
having a fair trial, and thus did not deny defendant due process of law); State v. Weaver,
386 S.E.2d 496, 498 & n.3 (WVa. 1989) (holding that prosecutor's question to defendant,
"I believe your wife is white, isn't she?" did not require mistrial where counsel objected to
question, and court sustained objection and instructed jury to disregard question, then
later instructed jury to disregard question to which objections had been sustained); State v.
Mayhue, 653 S.W2d 227 (Mo. App. 1983) (holding that the defendant's contention that
certain comments by the prosecutor were an attempt to derogate him because of his race
was unavailing, since it was evident to everyone associated with the trial that the defendant
was Black and the victims were White, so the racial relationship was of no surprise to anyone).
134.
Alternatively transliterated (from the classical Greek napaxcpt;) as paralepsis or

paraleipsis.
135.

See generally RicHAlt

A. LANHstAm, A HANDLIST OF RHETORCAL TERMS (1991);

Aquila Romanus, De Figuris Sententiarum et Elocutionis 5 8 in CARotus HALM, RHETORES
LATINI MINORES (1863).

MichiganJournal of Race & Law

[VOL. 11:325

defendant because he was a black man and the victim was a white boy
[is unavailing] ...Dixon's counsel argues that the Commonwealth's attorney actually intended to influence the jury to do
just what his words asked them not to do. We are not so persuaded. We have read the argument and find no indications of
any lack of
sincerity or lack of honest intent to avoid racial
36

prejudice.

The fact that Louis Dixon received the maximum sentence of ten
years on the basis of the complainant's uncorroborated testimony alone
seems to suggest that race did play some role at his trial. The court, however, ignored the prosecutor's use of a rhetorical figure that served to
summon up the jury's latent prejudices.
The California Court of Appeals likewise failed to note the use of
paralipsis when ruling that this section of a prosecutor's summation was
not an intentional attempt to inject the issue of the defendant Willie
Jones' race into the trial:
We should not be forced to be in a position where we cannot
enjoy ourselves, where our children-we have to be in fear that
something might happen to our children. I am not saying this
37
for the fact that there might be a number of Negroes there.'
A jury found Jones guilty of resisting arrest following a riot at a
public amusement park. The alleged riot ensued when two hundred Black
residents of Los Angeles intervened into an arrest to prevent what they
perceived as police brutality. In his summation, the prosecutor explicitly
drew a line between the city's White citizens ("ourselves," "our children")
and Black residents (the "rioters," "the defendant.") He then attempted to
disavow the inference that those who threaten "us" are the "Negroes", a
class of which Jones was a member.
The California Court of Appeals ignored the use of paralipsis, and
held that "any reasonably minded juror would interpret this statement to
mean that defendants of every race or color should be treated equally under the law. That being so, no prejudice could possibly have resulted."' 38
This reasoning misses the point entirely; the jury had been inflamed past
all reason by the statement that "we have to be in fear that something
might happen to our children" because of the frightening Negro 'brutes'
that might run amok in the city's amusement parks. In this context, they
could not have failed to take note of the real reason why the prosecutor
raised the issue of the continuing presence of Black people in the parks by
136.
added)
137.
138.

Dixon v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W2d 928, 929 (Ky. App 1972).(emphasis
People v.Jones, 23 Cal. Rptr. 418,422 (Cal. App. 1962).

Id.
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paralipsis: that since there are still a number of "Negroes there" they
needed to be kept under control, so that "we" and "our children" can enjoy that space.
When one considers the principles of rhetoric, it is obvious that the
prosecutor used paralipsis to define the defendant as a member of the racial "other", and in the process has constructed a bridge between herself
and the jury on the basis of their racial in-group status, thus establishing
her own credibility and ethos. The Courts should not tolerate the use of
this figure to accomplish these illicit rhetorical goals.
VI.ADDRESSING IMPLICITLY RACIST SUMMATIONS: EXPOSING AND
PROSCRIBING THE FIGURES OF SURREPTITIOUS DEFINITION

The foregoing analysis has demonstrated how the creation of the
McCleskey standard of review has created an incentive for prosecutors to
rely upon more subtle techniques to evoke jurors' racial prejudices by
means of the four key figures of definition illustrated above. On this basis,
it is possible to conclude that the crux of the problems related to the deployment of covertly racist argumentation in prosecutorial summations is
the failure of the appellate courts to recognize the role the key rhetorical
figures of definition used in closing arguments play in injecting racism
into the trial. Rather than recognizing the use of rhetorical techniques to
hide racist argumentation, courts have continued to apply the lenient
Darden standard, rather than the more rights-protective McCleskey standard.
Given that the only effective method of sanctioning this practice is
to reverse the convictions of those defendants whose trials the prosecutors
infected with racism, 139 the practical problem that confronts those who
would seek to eradicate racism from closing arguments is how to secure
holdings that recognize prosecutorial summations as racist, and thus apply
the McCleskey equal protection standard, and not as merely inflammatory
or otherwise opprobrious or damaging, and calling only for the application of the Darden level of review. The emergence of jurisprudence that
recognizes particular rhetorical techniques as evidence of intent to inject
race into a criminal trial is central to this enterprise.
It is unlikely that a brief addressing indirect racism in the summation
of a criminal trial will lead to a comprehensive holding that would eliminate all forms racist argumentation. Rather, the problem will probably be
addressed in a piecemeal manner; by exposing and foreclosing each of the
rhetorical techniques that prosecutors rely upon to disguise racist argumentation, which encompass and surpass the four figures discussed above.
139.
See generally David Crump, The Function and Limits of ProsecutionJury Argument,
28 Sw. L.J. 505, 505-06 (1974) ([A]buses of [closing argument] are aggravated by poor
development and enforcement of restrictions .... ).
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This approach fits well with the desire of the appellate courts to address
140
instances of prosecutorial misconduct in the narrowest manner possible.
Any holding on the subject of implicit racism that exposes the prejudicial
effect of a particular rhetorical figure would lay the basis for further extension of the jurisprudence by providing the analytic blueprint for each
succeeding opinion: this in itself would be a substantial achievement.
A. Crafting an Argument that the Prosecution Has Used a Rhetorical Figure
to Surreptitiously Inject the Defendant's Race into a Summation
The tasks of the appellate lawyer advancing the claim that the prosecutor injected the issue of the defendant's race into the trial are twofold.
The first goal is to differentiate the jurisprudence that pertains only to the
use of inflammatory argument in general (as a violation of due process)
from the cases discussing racist argumentation in particular (as a violation
of the equal protection clause). This is vital: if the court finds the argumentation to be racist, then the summation implicates the constitutional
rights of the defendant, and therefore the burden shifts to the prosecution
to demonstrate that the racist argumentation was
harmless beyond a rea41
sonable doubt, following Chapman v. California.
Second, the appellant should try to show that the injection of racism
into the trial, despite being accomplished by implicit means, was intentional. The key to demonstrating the implicit racism in a prosecutorial
summation is the demonstration of the intent to raise the issue of race.
While the test of whether the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right
to a trial free of racial prejudice does not formally require a showing of
intent, courts have been far more likely to reverse convictions on the basis
of summation misconduct when they believe that the prosecutor intentionally attempted
to influence the jury by making use of improper
• 142
argumentation. Therefore, it is important that the lawyer perfecting an
140.
Courts have imposed narrowly tailored limits on prosecutorial summations in
the past, addressing such particular rhetorical techniques as excessive use of the pronoun
"I": see, e.g., United States v. Nersesian, 824 E2d 1294, 1328 (2d Cir. 1987); the prosecutor's appeal to the prestige of their office, see, e.g., Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F2d 347 (2d Cir.
1990); courts have also found the argument that the jury must do their duty in the war
against crime to be improper, see, e.g., Brooks v. Kemp, 762 E2d 1383, 1414-15 (11th Cir.
1985) (en banc).
141.
Chapman,386 U.S. at 18.
142.
See Paul J. Spiegelman, ProsecutorialMisconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of
Intent in Appellate Review, 1 J. App. PRc. & PROCESS 115,140-43 (1999):
Despite the widespread perception that the prosecutor's intent is essentially
irrelevant to the decision to reverse, twenty-eight of the forty-five federal
opinions and Hill use language suggesting that the prosecutor knew that the
conduct was improper; in thirteen other opinions the conduct was such that
the prosecutor knew or should have known it was wrong.
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appeal alleging racist argumentation not only raises the claim that the
prosecutor injected the issue of race in such a way that it deprived the
defendant of his or her right to a fair trial, but also that the prosecution
intended to do so, in order to foreclose all possibility of a rational and fair
determination of the defendant's guilt.
The appellant's brief should center on an exposition of the rhetorical figures employed by the prosecutor in his summation. The brief should
illustrate how the argument advanced by the government at trial corresponds with a rhetorical figure explicitly developed by rhetoricians as a
means of raising an issue implicitly, such as antonomasia, systrophe, circumitio,
and/or paralipsis.The brief should focus on the symmetry between the
advice of the rhetoricians on how to execute the strategy of raising an
illicit issue implicitly and the disputed section of the prosecutor's summation. The closer the resemblance between the examples in the classical
rhetorical texts and the prosecutor's use of the rhetorical figure, the more
the appellant should argue that it is likely that the prosecutor intended to
make use of these rhetorical figures to craft an argument with implicitly
racist elements.
Put simply, the more persuasively a parallel can be drawn by the appellant between the language used in the prosecutor's summation and the
examples of the figures detailed in this Article, the more apparent it will
be that the prosecutor intentionally attempted to raise the issue of the
defendant's race without mentioning it directly on the record. The argument can be loosely built around an analogy: Just as if a prosecutor who
claimed he accidentally struck the defendant in the courtroom could be
rebutted with evidence that his blow corresponds closely to an advanced
martial arts technique, the prosecutor's well-executed use of the rhetorical
figure should stand as indirect evidence of a calculated intent to make an
implicitly racist reference to the jury.
This approach sets up the second stage of the strategy. If the appellant's brief focuses on the intentions of the prosecutor, they may thereby
provoke the appellee into placing their counterargument about the lack of
intent at the center of their response brief. If the government's response
brief focuses on the lack of intent, the appellant should note in their reply
brief that the lack of intention is not fatal to their constitutional claim.
The appellant can argue in response that even if the injection of racism
into the trial was unintentional, the test for whether or not the court
143
should reverse the conviction does not (theoretically) rest upon intent.
Instead, it is the symmetry between the suspect elements in the prosecutor's argument and the classic and modern examples of the figure
described above that demonstrates that the effect on the jury was likely to
have been significant. Furthermore, the appellant can argue that any
143.
Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,53 U. PiTT. L. REv. 393, 440 (1992)
("The prosecutor's motive to unfairly prejudice a defendant is ordinarily not relevant.").
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demonstration of a lack of intent is not adequate, since the appellee must
demonstrate that the error (Which was not the introduction of the racist
argumentation but rather the trial court's tolerance of the racism within
the summation) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. Managing the InterdisciplinaryAspects of the Argument Drawing Upon
Rhetorical and Race Theory: The Uses of Amicus Briefs
The approach advocated in this Article to exposing implicitly racist
prosecutorial argumentation is necessarily interdisciplinary, and it raises
the question of how scholars both in the discipline of law and the discipline of rhetoric 144 might effectively coordinate their efforts when
appellate attorneys present claims of racist prosecutorial misconduct in
summation to the appellate courts. Since it is unlikely that an active
member of the bar would have the time to research the techniques of
rhetoric, she should request help from scholars who specialize in the rhetorical dimensions of legal argumentation. It is also possible that legal
academics, working alongside rhetorical theorists, could file amicus briefs
that focus exclusively on drawing the parallel between the classical figure
and the prosecutor's summation, which might then be cross-cited extensively in the appellant's brief.
Another effective tactic might be to procure additional amicus briefs
from legal academics within the Critical Race Theory movement. The
point of these briefs would be to argue that the appellate judges should
not commence their evaluation of the effect of implicitly racist arguments
while assuming that the jurors were inclined to reject racist argumentation. Rather, judges should begin with the assumption that stereotypes
can be so powerful that it might only take the slightest cue by a prosecutor to provoke a racist response, and that this is likely to have been one of
the rhetorical dynamics at work. These briefs should also cite the social
science studies discussed above, which reveal the predominance of racist
attitudes in society, as well as the incendiary effect of invoking racist ideas
that correspond to the racial caricatures discussed in this Article.
Finally, if the centerpiece of the attack on implicitly racist argumentation is the claim that the injection of the issue of the defendant's race
was intentional, the appellant's counsel should pay close attention to the
record of the peremptory challenges, and the races of the venirepersons
and the jury. If there is any evidence that the prosecution attempted to
exclude African Americans from the jury, even if this does not rise to the

144.
Rhetoric, although an ancient subject, continues to be studied in the modern
university, largely within departments of speech communication.
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level of a Batson violation," 5 this fact could be central to the appeal. The
exclusion of Black jurors is excellent circumstantial evidence that the
prosecution intended to provoke racial animus against the defendant, since
it prepares the field for the use of covert racist allusions.
Wanda Jean Allen's counsel on her first Oklahoma appeal argued
that the prosecution had exercised a peremptory challenge against an African American venireperson because of her race.4 6 The Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeal found that flimsy, yet purportedly race-neutral reasons
for striking this juror (including "she made a facial expression by raising
her eyebrows when she said she could consider the death penalty") were
sufficient. 1 7 And yet, appellate counsel never exploited the potential for
linking this issue with the prosecutor's racist remarks. Counsel for the appellant alleging the prosecution's use of implicit racism within his or her
summation should make extensive use of this fact as circumstantial evidence of intent to inject the race of the defendant into the trial,just as the
prosecution did in Wanda Jean Allen's case.
CONCLUSION
The problem of racist argumentation contained in prosecutors,
summations is serious. There is a great incentive for the government to
incite racism from jurors to secure convictions; however, no countervailing disincentive has emerged as yet, since the appellate courts are either
unwilling or unable to recognize implicitly racist argumentation. In particular, summations containing a variety of rhetorical techniques that
associate a Black criminal defendant with the brute caricature have survived appellate review, despite implicit appeals to one of the most racist
images circulated about African Americans.
Despite the failure of the courts to address the problem of implicitly
racist arguments, possibilities remain for appellants' counsel to address the
prejudice to their clients induced by the use of these rhetorical figures
during the defendants' trials. However, an effective strategy demands more
than a brief that cites the right jurisprudence and quotes the prosecutors'
implicitly racist argumentation. The appellant's brief requires a detailed
analysis of the prosecutors' rhetorical strategy, one that exposes the intent
to define the defendant by reference to the brute caricature, and to inject
the issue of the defendants' race into the trial.
Mapping the rhetorical strategy begins with a consideration of the
ways in which implicit allusions to the defendant's race were made in
145.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). A Batson violation of the equal protection clause occurs whenever a prosecutor engages in a pattern of intentional behavior
designed at excluding jurors of the defendant's race from his or her jury.

146.
147.

See Allen, 871 P2d at 89-90.
Id.
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order to define the defendant in such a way as to evoke a racist response
from jurors, and particular attention should be paid to the figures of definition employed in the summation. Based on the analysis of the case law,
the four most likely possibilities are the use of systrophe, antonomasia, circumitio, and paralipsis.Since the courts almost invariably consider the intent
of the prosecution when considering an appeal alleging misconduct,
counsel for the appellant should attempt to work backwards from the use
of racist figures of definition to demonstrate the prosecutor's prejudicial
intent.
Demonstrating how the prosecutor's argument conforms to what
rhetoricians have described as an effective way of defining the defendant
in the mind of the jurors is excellent, if circumstantial, evidence of that
malicious intent.
Illustrating how the prosecutors' judicious use of rhetorical figures
elicited a racist response is not a simple process. Attorneys should attempt
to secure advice and assistance from rhetoricians, who can collaborate on
cases and file amicus briefs that can be cross-referenced in the appellant's
brief. In addition, social scientists and scholars from the Critical Race
Studies movement could also play an important part in this litigation
strategy.These scholars can provide evidence that an implicit allusion to a
racist caricature is likely to produce the desired effect, given the context
of race relations and the stereotypes about African Americans that exist
because of the history of the oppression of Black Americans.
This attempt to frame the issues to highlight the racism inherent
within a prosecutorial summation may not initially prove successful. Even
if appellate counsel can secure reversals of convictions in this manner, they
will likely only lead to narrowly tailored holdings, which will not address
the systematic problem of implicit racism being deployed in closing arguments. However, even one successful attempt could create a template
for other appellants, and in this manner, each of the rhetorical figures
identified above would be exposed as a method of promoting racially biased deliberations. Ultimately, it is the revelation of the prevalence and
power of the range of rhetorical devices that prosecutors use to inject the
issue of the defendant's race into the trial that will force the courts to address this problem.
Despite the inherent difficulties of this approach and the uncertainty
of a positive result, appellant attorneys must address this problem. When a
prosecutor can compare a Black woman to a gorilla in his summation,
and the appellate courts dismiss this racial slur as "name-calling", this imperils not only the integrity of the courts but also the pursuit of justice.
Those who continue to believe in the possibility of equal justice under
the law cannot allow these arguments to pass by unimpeded by vigorous
advocacy, which adopts any weapon with which to assail injustice. Rhetorical analysis is not a silver bullet for any problem involving
prosecutorial misconduct in summation, but it is an arrow that should be
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in the quiver of every appellate attorney who encounters issues of this
type. In combination with other techniques and methods of analysis, it
can be part of a successful attack on implicitly racist discourse, which is a
crucial battle in the fight for fairness and against racism in the criminal
justice system today.

